Text(s)
“Notes on Scientific Philosophy”

Learning Objectives
We come back to this text in Level II to take a closer look at it from a different vantage point. It helps us see that the logic of fundamentalism obstructs questions concerning its foundations because they are based on a set of unexamined assumptions. All the while, this logic promises the following three epistemic ideal— Certainty, Exactitude, and Universality. In contrast, the logic of relations openly takes as its foundation the rule, “Do not block the way of inquiry,” and offers three alternate ideals—Probability, Continuity, and Evolution. This text tells us that to move from logic of fundamentalism to the logic of relations, we have to first and foremost correct our vision. So that when we inquire about X, our goal would not be to arrive at a knowledge claim about X that is beyond any doubt, precise to the last dot, and without any exceptions whatsoever. It would rather be to arrive at a knowledge claim about X that is most probable, relating to things around it, and open to novel experience.